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Law as the enabler of capitalism 
 
Law is not an accidental by-product of capitalism, nor is it a distinct social system 
operating in parallel to capitalist economics. Rather, law is central to capitalism. Law 
is the means by which capitalism gets its work done. Without a quiescent legal system 
and a quiescent cadre of lawyers skilled in everything from corporate reorganisations 
to the manipulation of trust assets, modern capitalism could not exist in its modern 
form. This modern form of capitalism is a newer form – dubbed ‘ultra-capitalism’ 
here – which uses corporate lawyers to bleed value out of companies, to avoid 
regulatory oversight and to dodge liability to tax. This ultra-capitalism is not capable 
of redemption; but it is urgent need of a profound conceptual revolution. It is through 
non-capitalist models of commercial enterprise, like the co-operative, that balance can 
yet be restored to the economy and to our law.  
 
 
The nature of capitalism 
 
This collection considers whether or not there is any hope of redemption for 
capitalism. The word ‘capitalism’ is itself important, and too little discussed. 
Capitalism is an ‘ism’: that is, an ideology. It is an ideology which considers it to be 
right that some people will own the capital and that everyone else will work for the 
capital-owners. On the classical Marxian model, the worker takes a wage while the 
capitalist takes the much greater surplus value.1 The worker produces while the 
capitalist owns the means of production. Capitalism requires class stratification on the 
basis of money. Property law, employment contract law and corporate law are central 
to the maintenance of that stratification because they fix ownership of assets within 
one class while organising the obligations of the other classes as different types of 
workers. Jeremy Corbyn led the Labour Party into the 2017 General Election on the 
basis that he would combat the ‘rigged system’. The law that is discussed here is the 
legal constituent of that rigged system. 
 
 
The evolution of capitalism 
 
There are several types of capitalism. In truth, they are different understandings of the 
evolution of capitalism over time. There was the first generation, modernist capitalism 
of the joint stock companies in the Industrial Revolution.2 A system dedicated to 
narrow ownership of the means of production and of a generation of surplus value for 
                                                 
1 K Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Penguin Classics, 1990, 293 et seq, ‘The 
Production of Absolute Surplus Value’.  
2 E Hobsbawn, The Age of Capital: 1848–1875, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975. 
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the enrichment of those owners. It is part of the ‘locomotive logic of capitalism’ that 
ever more power and ever more wealth resides in ever fewer hands.3 The modern 
‘ultra-capitalist’ – in the manner of Russian oligarchs like Roman Abramovich or 
asset-strippers like Philip Green, in the manner of multinational companies which 
only manage brands and information, or in the manner of the global investment banks 
and hedge funds – generates wealth by using law and by using specialist lawyers to 
strip value out of useful enterprises. Whereas law has always been a way of 
entrenching the wealth and power of an ownership class – from basic land ownership 
through to a form of corporate shareholding which shields investors from personal 
liability for the actions of the company – the modern use of law in the 21st century 
(with the connivance of both lawyers and the courts) is to enable the ultra-capitalist to 
bleed wealth out of income-generating, employment-providing enterprises for 
personal gain.  
 
There is no space here for a complete history of the evolution of capitalism. What is 
suggested here is that there have been several stages of capitalism. It developed from 
the enclosure of common agricultural land into the industrial revolution and the 
construction of railroads and factories by early capitalists like John Pierpoint Morgan. 
Significantly, its modern incarnation is found in the global financial system which has 
ensured a ‘financialisation’ of the world economy.4 The ‘locomotive logic’ of 
capitalism is for mergers of ever-larger, monopolistic corporations which capture 
markets and which capture public policy on an international scale.5 The name ‘JP 
Morgan’ is a good metaphor for this qualitative change in the nature of capitalism. It 
signals a transformation of capitalism from the tangible production of a John Pierpoint 
Morgan who built railroads and factories, into the crisis-inducing, mathematical 
abstractions of the investment bank JP Morgan which developed the credit derivatives 
which amplified a local difficulty in US sub-prime mortgage markets into a global 
economic collapse.6 Its abstractions are a metaphor for the working practices of this 
ultra-capitalism – it has moved from a stage of useful production to an age of 
financialised reproduction.  
 
 
The law as facilitator of ultra-capitalism 
 
What is important for the purposes of this essay is to observe that there have been 
qualitative shifts in the nature of capitalism, and that the ultra-capitalism of the 21st 
century is a form of capitalism which is dependent on a quiescent legal system – 
staffed by lawyers and by judges – to get its work done. Starbucks and Google cannot 
reduce their tax liabilities to vanishing point without skilled intellectual property and 
tax lawyers who relocate their profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Tax dodgers and 
international criminals cannot hide their assets from regulatory oversight without an 
elite cadre of trusts and corporate lawyers operating across borders through tax 
havens. Asset-strippers cannot dismember companies without lawyers skilled in the 
deft manipulation of securities regulation and company law extracting every last drop 
of value from viable businesses.  
                                                 
3 AS Hudson, ‘Too much monkey business’, Tribune, 29 October 1993.  
4 T Palley, “Financialisation: what it is and why it matters”, The Levy Economics Institute for 
Democratic and Open Societies. 
5 AS Hudson, ‘Too much monkey business’, Tribune, 29 October 1993.  
6 G Tett, Fool’s Gold, Little, Brown, 2009.  
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Significantly, none of these techniques would be possible without the participation of 
quiescent judges allowing these approaches. A good example was the decision of the 
House of Lords in Barclays Mercantile v Mawson7 which allowed tax avoidance 
schemes to be assessed against literal readings of statutes instead of purposive 
readings designed to root out ‘artificial steps’ in transactions. The judges chose to 
help the tax avoidance industry with that judgment by blunting the progressive 
Ramsay principle8 which had combated artificial tax avoidance schemes with 
purposive interpretations of those arrangements and of tax statutes. Of course, none of 
these avoidance techniques would be possible without quiescent governments drafting 
deliberately weak legislation. A good example is the “General Anti-Avoidance Rule” 
in s.206 of the Finance Act 2013 which permits challenges to be brought against the 
obscurely-named ‘abusive’ tax avoidance schemes if a panel comprised entirely of tax 
practitioners with a background in those very techniques agrees to that action.9 It 
would be difficult to imagine a means of combating tax avoidance that more evidently 
and intentionally contained the seeds of its own destruction. It depends upon turkeys 
(in the form of a panel of tax avoidance professionals) voting for Christmas (in the 
form of allowing HMRC to proceed against tax dodgers). The judiciary has been 
complicit in allowing every Englishman ‘to order his [sic] affairs so that the tax 
attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be’ (in Lord 
Tomlin’s famous phrase10) as a route to allowing tax avoidance through the 
manipulation of our overly-complex tax codes. The legal system – through its judicial, 
executive and legislative branches – has been entirely complicit with these forms of 
ultra-capitalist abuse.  
 
Central to the argument of this essay is the observation that lawyers and judges are 
vital to ultra-capitalism in its current form: that is, operating across borders, using 
complex financial instruments to acquire their objectives, and both generating and 
shielding excessive wealth for individuals by using traditional legal techniques. Thus 
trusts, companies and similar techniques are vital to its operation.  
 
 
A map of what is to follow 
 
By way of an example of the law as a key facilitator of this new model of capitalism, 
we shall consider how trusts law has been torn from its roots in the philosophy of 
Aristotle (and his model of equity as an ethical engine within a legal system) and 
transformed into a sophisticated means of concealing assets from regulatory 
oversight. We shall consider how corporate law is central to the manipulation of 
business assets so that the ultra-capitalist can enhance their own personal wealth and 
drain value out of commercial enterprises by using corporate restructurings, shell 
companies and a raft of little-known financial techniques. We shall consider how a 
system of the privatisation of law by banking trade associations and their lawyers 
                                                 
7 Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson [2004] UKHL 51; [2005] 1 AC 684. 
8 Ramsay v IRC [1982] AC 300; Furniss v Dawson [1984] AC 474. 
9 Finance Act 2013, Sch.43. The first chair of the panel was a QC specialising in tax advice and the 
current chair is a solicitor with magic circle law firm Allen & Overy specialising in tax advice. The 
entire panel is comprised in fact of specialist tax advisors. This fact absolutely beggars belief.  
10 Duke of Westminster v IRC [1936] AC 1. 
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enables the ultra-capitalists and the banking industry to operate outside the confines of 
the nation state and national law.  
 
An alternative model to these capitalist legal structures is the co-operative. The co-
operative does not seek to separate assets off from the main business in the way that a 
limited liability company does. Instead it recognises the rights of the workforce as a 
collective in those assets and in that undertaking. It entitles them to communal 
ownership of the enterprise but recognises individual property rights in nothing. This 
also prevents the ‘lines of flight’ by which the ultra-capitalist company extracts profits 
from the geographical location in which the human beings work and sends them to an 
offshore world of Alice in Wonderland accounting and offshore financing vehicles.11 
Ultra-capitalism promises little regulatory oversight and few ties with a workforce or 
physical locations. In short, it promises little responsibility for the ultra-wealthy or for 
multinational corporations. As such, it is a rigged system.  
 
The ultimate aim of this essay is to identify ways in which this form of capitalism can 
be closed off so that its practices of extracting value from useful undertakings can be 
stopped and instead its value kept geographically close to the places where the work is 
done. This will involve reorganising the corporate governance of modern companies; 
using regulation on a different model to prevent excessive activity in financial 
markets so as to halt the process of privatising law; and reawakening our 
understanding of co-operatives as alternative business models.  
 
The common theme running through these alternative understandings of how 
commercial undertakings could be organised is that there needs to be democracy and 
not simply despotic ownership by one class (of owners) at the expense of another 
class (of workers). So, by way of example, corporate governance in companies in the 
UK should involve ‘industrial democracy’ to prevent the extraction of all value for the 
enrichment of the ultra-capitalists, and to enable common ownership of the means of 
production and profit.12 Democratic structures within companies will also unlock the 
knowledge and expertise held inside those organisations beyond the executive board 
of directors. The conclusion which these reforms prompt is that capitalism as it is 
currently organised is beyond redemption and that only alternative understandings 
which are not capitalist can introduce democracy to our economic and commercial 
relationships.  
 
The best recent example of the deployment of these ultra-capitalist techniques is the 




II. CORPORATE LAW, ULTRA-CAPITALISM AND THE IMMOLATION OF BHS 
 
The features of the new ultra-capitalism 
 
It is important to recognise that the form of capitalism in existence today at the 
multinational level is very different from the earlier, Fordist models of capitalism. 
                                                 
11 Z Bauman, Liquid Modernity, Polity, 1999.  
12 Tony Benn, speech to the AUEW conference, Morecambe, May 1971, quoted below.  
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Ultra-capitalism is not concerned with building assets but rather with extracting value 
from them. The clearest recent example of this process in operation was the 
immolation of BHS by Philip Green and his associates so that a high street brand 
(which was in truth a warehouse for other manufacturer’s products) would generate 
billions of pounds in profits for him personally before the husk (along with eleven 
thousand jobs and twenty thousand pensions) was thrown away.13  
 
 
How company lawyers dismember companies: the example of BHS 
 
It ought to be surprising that our laws allowed Philip Green to take an estimated £1.2 
billion from BHS over several years, and then to sell the husk off for £1 in March 
2015, without any legal redress against him personally. To understand how law 
operates as a servant of ultra-capitalism, the BHS scandal serves as a very good 
example. What matters for present purposes is that this exsanguination of BHS took 
place entirely lawfully and with the expert advice of professional lawyers, accountants 
and bankers.  
 
Law is a series of rituals. Procedures must be followed. The immolation of BHS took 
effect by means of just such a series of rituals developed by practising lawyers. BHS 
Plc was a ‘quoted’ public company before its acquisition in 2000. That meant it was 
subject to the rules of the London Stock Exchange. In 2000 it would have become 
subject to the securities regulations implemented by the (then) brand new Financial 
Services Authority. Those rules would have required management to provide large 
amounts of financial and strategic information to the marketplace and would have 
opened up the treatment of BHS to public scrutiny. Instead, BHS Plc was pulled into a 
darkness where public disclosures were not required. This was done by the process 
known as ‘taking it private’. That is the company law technique of converting the 
company from a public company (with its shares traded publicly and subject to public 
disclosures of information overseen by a statutory regulator) into a private company 
(with limited disclosure requirements and only private sales of its shares). These legal 
techniques operated so as to subvert the regulations which had been put in place to 
protect employees and investors in commercial enterprises of this sort.  
 
BHS Plc was acquired for £200 million in 2000,14 although the assets acquired 
included £44.78 million in cash.15 Philip Green’s specialist advisors constructed a 
web of front companies and offshore trusts which conducted these transactions. 
Private Eye reported that the purchase was conducted through an offshore family 
trusts and that latterly dividends were paid to Global Textiles Investments, a company 
based in Jersey and controlled by Christina (‘Tina’) Green, wife of Philip Green.16 
The Economist reported further that a large portion of the purchase price was acquired 
with instruments structured by the investment banking arm of West LB, the formerly 
traditional German regional bank which needed to be bailed out during the financial 
crisis because it had moved into structured financial products to a disastrous extent 
                                                 
13 AS Hudson, “BHS and the Reform of Corporate Law, (2016) 37 Company Lawyer, 364-371. 
14 See, for example, The Financial Times, ‘How much money did the Greens make?’ 28 April 2016; 
and The Economist, ‘A star falls?’ 29th May 2003.  
15 Private Eye, ‘In the City: Green’s BHS bargain’, 13 May 2016.  
16 Ibid. 
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during the boom years.17 Importantly, the BHS pension fund was in a healthy surplus 
until 2002 and BHS Ltd earned profits of £208 million between 2002 and 2004.18 
Therefore, Green’s collection of trusts and companies acquired a profitable business, 
a large number of real estate assets, a large amount of cash, and a pension fund in 
surplus. 
 
What followed the purchase was the exsanguination of BHS: that is, a process through 
which value was bled out of the company in a number of ways, in which the business 
was run into loss during the boom years at the start of the 21st century, and in which 
the pension fund was run into an unsustainable deficit. In 2005, BHS had been folded 
into the Arcadia group of companies, along with companies like Topshop. This 
corporate reorganisation made it more difficult to identify from the outside how these 
private companies were being treated within the general group of companies. That the 
group was ‘private’ meant that little information had to be made public. Importantly, 
the public nature of the company – its presence on every major high street, its 
employment of eleven thousand people, and its role in the supply chain – remained 
the same. 
 
The combined Work and Pensions and BIS Select Committees’ joint report into the 
BHS collapse tells us that BHS earned profits of £208 million between 2002 and 
2004.19 Nevertheless, the company paid dividends of £414 million in this period. 
Importantly, this means that these dividends were more than twice the profits of the 
company. Therefore, there were dividends of £206 million paid out to shareholders 
which were not funded out of profits in that period. Rather, those profits must have 
been funded by bleeding other assets out of the company. The select committees 
found that £307 million of those dividends were paid to ‘the Green family’ and not to 
shareholders in general.20 Despite this payment of huge dividends, there was a fairly 
flat turnover during the boom years of the first decade of this century. So, the business 
itself was allowed to stall during an economic boom and value was drawn out of the 
company at the same time. The objective was to take value out of the company. 
Corporate law practitioners and their specialist knowledge were the tools for doing 
that.  
 
The headline-grabber was the payment of a dividend of £1.3 billion from the Arcadia 
group of companies (including BHS) to entities controlled by Tina Green in 2005. 
Tina Green was a resident of the tax haven of Monaco. Therefore, the lawyers 
contrived to take this eye-watering personal profit out of the company in a tax 
efficient manner. It is an important part of the ultra-capitalist’s world that they are 
sheltered from life’s inconveniences by their lawyers and their accountants. Again, 
payments were made in tax efficient ways into a tax haven by highly-paid 
professionals. The point is that for an ultra-capitalist there is no need to earn a profit. 
Instead, assets can be liquidated and value moved around between groups of 
companies in tax havens.  
                                                 
17 The Economist, ‘A star falls?’, 29 May 2003. This structured products team at West LB are reported 
by The Economist to have loaded the bank with large amounts of poor assets early in the century 
through deals over Kyndal International, Odeon cinemas, Box Clever and so forth. 
18 Work and Pensions and Business Innovation and Skills Committees, “BHS”, HC 54, 20 July 2016 
(“WP/BIS select committee report”).  




Not content with using dividend payments, the Greens’ advisors found other ways of 
picking every morsel from the bones of BHS. The select committee report tells us that 
different companies controlled by the Greens acquired premises from BHS for £105 
million and then raised rents of about £15 million per annum on those same properties 
by leasing them back to BHS. In total these property arrangements had raised 
approximately £150 million by 2015.21 In similar ways, the Greens were able to raise 
other ‘fees’ from BHS, including fees for ‘administration’, which came to £58 million 
in 2013.22  
 
The BHS story has an unhappy ending, of course. By March 2015, BHS’s assets had 
fallen from £501 million in 2002 to £295 million; liabilities had grown from £205 
million in 2002 to £551 million; and accumulated reserves had fallen from £228 
million in 2002 to a deficit of £323 million. The company was sold to the former 
racing driver and twice bankrupt Dominic Chappell for £1 in March 2015. 
Interestingly, this was prompted not because the business failed and had to be closed 
down. Instead, the Greens wanted to off-load the corpse of BHS from their corporate 
balance sheet.  
 
While the pension fund had been in surplus in 2002, it had fallen into an estimated 
deficit of £571 million by the time of the joint select committees’ report in 2016. The 
pension fund is, of course, comprised of contributions made by BHS staff from their 
salaries as well as contributions made by the company. It is deferred pay for those 
employees. The company was simply not being allowed to perform its part in 
maintaining that fund, at a cost to those employees. This anomaly in pensions law 
which allows the pension fund to be bled dry and driven into deficit as a result of the 
employer ceasing to make payments into it (the euphemistically named ‘contributions 
holiday’) is a clear connivance between legislator, regulator and capitalist. The only 
loser in this context is the pensioner who contributes a monthly amount to the same 
fund with no possibility of a ‘holiday’.  
 
Capitalism on this model is without redeeming feature. What remains is the question: 
how do we address this ultra-capitalist abuse?  
 
 
The lack of a regulator for ordinary companies 
 
There is no regulator for ordinary companies simply qua companies in the UK. There 
is no entity which can intervene in the way that the Financial Conduct Authority, or 
the Prudential Regulation or Financial Policy Committees of the Bank of England, 
could intervene in relation to a failing bank under the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000 or the Banking Act 2009. Rather, trading companies are allowed to fail 
unless they contravene some other regulatory norm in another area of law.  
 
The process of registration with Companies House under the Companies Act 2006 
does not accompany regulatory oversight of the performance of the company. There is 
no sanction in the form of the withdrawal of a licence to trade (either as a public 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 The Financial Times, ‘How much money did the Greens make?’ 28 April 2016.  
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company or as a private company with limited liability) if the company is being 
wilfully driven towards insolvency. Instead, political hand-wringing accompanies 
corporate failures long after the event as the professionals go to work on 
dismembering the corpse. The running down of the pension fund and the reduction of 
the company’s assets should trigger a regulatory response, especially where individual 
shareholders are taking dividends of £1.3 billion out of a company, thus reducing the 
asset base of the enterprise to the cost of its suppliers, employees and pensioners. The 
withdrawal of the authorisation to trade as a company with limited liability should be 
a weapon granted to a new corporate regulator, akin to the power of the financial 
regulatory bodies to withdraw authorisation to trade in financial services business 
from failing banks and other financial institutions. In tandem with the creation of 
supervisory boards in UK companies (discussed below) this would enable parties 
outside the shareholders and the executive board of directors to control how the 
company’s business is conducted.  
 
 
Reforming corporate law to meeting the challenge of the super-capitalists 
 
So, what else can be done to combat situations like the exsanguination of BHS? There 
are five things which can be done to reform our corporate law and prevent the 
immolation of more public companies in this way.23  
 
First, expand the concept of ‘financial assistance’.24 At present, it is unlawful for a 
company to assist anyone directly or indirectly to acquire shares in that same 
company.25 So, for example, a company may not give money to an investor nor may it 
make a loan to that investor for the purpose of buying shares in the company itself. 
Thus, A Plc may not lend money to Bernice to buy shares in A Plc. Otherwise, this 
would make a false market in those shares and it would make the company’s capital 
base look much bigger than it actually was. Oddly, in practice, this does not seem to 
prevent one particularly common transaction. In that situation, the person taking over 
the company organises to borrow money, uses that loan to purchase the target 
company’s shares, and then passes the responsibility for repaying the loan to the 
newly-acquired company. This will have been the plan from the outset between the 
purchaser and the lender. Despite this being an arrangement in which the company 
would be responsible for the loan which funded that purchase of shares ultimately, 
this is not prosecuted as being unlawful financial assistance. The only distinguishing 
feature between normal financial assistance and this method is that in this method the 
financial assistance is made immediately after the acquisition rather than immediately 
before. Several Premier League football clubs have been acquired in this way.26 The 
purchasers buy the shares using borrowed money and then transfer the debt to the club 
as soon as the deal is complete. A concerted arrangement of this sort should be treated 
as being financial assistance.27  
                                                 
23 AS Hudson, “BHS and the Reform of Corporate Law, (2016) 37 Company Lawyer, 364-371. John 
McDonnell MP adopted these ideas as Labour Party policy in July 2016, after seeing a draft of an early 
draft of this and connected papers, and presented them in his speech to Labour Party Conference in 
Liverpool in September of that year. 
24 Companies Act 2006, s.678(1). 
25 Ibid.  
26 AS Hudson, The Law of Finance, 2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013. 
27 Brady v Brady [1989] AC 755. 
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Second, prevent dividends being paid out of borrowed money.28 When BHS paid 
twice the level of its profits to its shareholders in dividends, that meant that value was 
being sucked from somewhere else in the company. That dividend payment was only 
possible if other assets were liquidated or if the company was taking on debt (directly 
or indirectly). The rules on dividend payments need to be tightened up so that they 
cannot be paid directly or indirectly out of borrowed money. In the case of BHS that 
allowed money to be sucked out of the company and paid to the Green family, leaving 
BHS with a shrinking asset base even in the boom years before the ‘credit crunch’ of 
2007.  
 
Third, there should be a right to claw back dividends when a company has been 
dismembered and then allowed to fail. Insolvency law allows the recovery of assets 
when they have been put unlawfully beyond the reach of creditors. This statutory 
power has been allowed by the courts to last for a long period of time and is the 
nemesis of anyone who tried to ‘put the house in their wife’s name’ or hide their 
valuables in their mother-in-law’s garage before going bankrupt. The case law is 
equally prepared to act retrospectively in relation to ‘asset protection trusts’ and other 
devices which people use to protect their property against insolvency before they start 
a risky venture.29 There is no reason why asset-strippers should escape the statutory 
claw on their shoulder. 
 
Fourth, the Takeover Code needs to be reformed so that a public company cannot be 
taken over until the intended purchaser presents a strategy to the regulators for the 
‘success of the company’ (which the directors are required to promote under the 
Companies Act 2006) and for the maintenance of the pension fund. That strategy must 
also make plain how the acquisition of the company will be funded, and whether or 
not the company will be required to assume responsibility for the purchaser’s debts 
afterwards.  
 
Fifth, trading companies with employees and pensioners must now be required to 




III. INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Towards Industrial Democracy 
 
Capitalism is, by its very nature, anti-democratic. Its intention is to recognise the 
property and profit-sharing rights of a capitalist ownership class, and thus to exclude 
any other claims. That ownership class is to be protected from the loss of its assets, 
and it is to be shielded from any liability arising from its investment. Nevertheless, 
there is a curious tendency in the West to think of the capitalist system as being bound 
up with democracy.30 In essence, the wealth that cascades down in the form of wages 
                                                 
28 See Companies Act 2006, s.830. 
29 AS Hudson, ‘Asset protection trusts’ in D Hayton (ed), The International Trust, Jordans, 2011, 261. 
30 In the sitcom Peep Show, the character Mark Corrigan exclaims with no little passion that the rights 
and happiness of the other people around him are attributable only to ‘the miracle of consumer 
capitalism’.  
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is said to be sufficient reward for adherence to this system, accompanied by the 
political promise of neoliberalism that each citizen could potentially become 
excessively wealthy too. Other models are, of course, possible but they require the 
displacement of the ideology of capitalism that the wealth should be owned by a 
narrow social class and that the decisions about the direction of a company should be 
controlled by that same narrow class.  
 
The limited liability company is at the heart of this model of capitalism. The UK 
company law approach to corporate governance sees the company as an autonomous 
creature of the shareholders under the control of the directors in practice. The 
Victorian model of the limited liability company emerges clearly from Trollope’s The 
Way We Live Now in which titled aristocrats lent the lustre of their names to the 
company by constituting its board and shareholders, but the day-to-day work was 
done entirely by middle-class professionals employed for the task. Hence the 
recognition in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance that directors need not attend the 
company’s premises nor company meetings very often at all.31 This has prompted 
Ireland to think of these sorts of shareholders as being akin to ‘rentier landlords’ who 
take an income from property with which they have little day-to-day connection.32 As 
emerges below, the current composition of shareholders in UK public companies 
shows that 54% of shares are held by overseas investors and that the typical 
shareholding lasts for only one month. Therefore, the majority of shareholders have 
only slight connections with companies.  
 
Rather long-term stakes are held by the employees, those who deal with these 
companies in the supply chain, and the pensioners in the company pension scheme. 
Nevertheless, the workers have no direct rights qua workers in the affairs of the 
company. Rather their powers are reserved to their contracts of employment or to 
exercises of industrial action or negotiation. As such, a company is not a democratic 
place: there are no rights to be heard simply because you are a human being with a 
stake in the performance of the company.  
 
 
Democracy in the workplace 
 
In Britain, we talk about democracy in relation to elections but not in relation to our 
workplaces. Other thinking is possible. By definition, social democracy should 
require bringing the democracy into social and economic life. There is a seam in 
corporate theory – especially in the work of Charles Handy33 – which understands the 
company as being a community of people and not simply as a legal person forming 
contracts. In a workplace that is itself a community (in the way that Handy explains 
the company) there is a need for democracy to represent all of the participants in that 
community.  
                                                 
31 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd [1925] Ch 407. Romer J took the approach that directors 
bore little personal responsibility to turn up for anything more than board meetings and that they could 
delegate the day-to-day administration of the company’s business to subordinate managers and 
employees. 
32 P Ireland, ‘Company law and the myth of shareholder ownership’, (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 
32; P Ireland, ‘Corporate governance, stakeholding, and the company: towards a less degenerate 
capitalism?’ [1996] 23 Journal of Law and Society 287.  
33 C Handy, ‘People and Change’, in G Radice (ed), What Needs to Change? HarperCollins, 1996.  
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Tony Benn gave us a model34 of how a democratic company might work and why that 
might be important:  
 
‘If we are going to talk about industrial policy, let’s start with the people. Let’s 
forget about legislation for a moment and start talking about industrial 
democracy. And I mean industrial democracy and not just better 
communications, or more personnel managers, or consultations, or 
participation or company news-sheets. Least of all am I talking about putting 
one ‘tame’ worker on the board of a company, or trying to pretend that a few 
shares for the workers will make them into little capitalists and iron out real 
conflicts of interest. 
 I am talking about democracy. And democracy means that the people 
ultimately control their managers. Just that, no less and no more. It’s time we 
asked ourselves some fundamental questions about the management of 
industry.’ 
 
There are three important ideas bound up in these two paragraphs. First, a form of 
democracy which involves all of the workers in the operation of the business that 
employs them. More than involving them, it gives them control of that business. This 
is the antithesis of the traditional British model where the capitalists control the 
business through their managers, the directors. The British model assumes not only 
that workers have nothing meaningful to contribute but also that they should have no 
right to participate despite it being the workers who are closer to the means of 
production, to the customer base and to the underlying success of the company than 
the corporate executives.  
 
Second, democracy on this model is more than the disingenuous development of 
internal corporate communications like circular emails. It is also more than the token 
representation of one or two workers’ representatives on the corporate board. Instead 
it requires genuine democracy in which the workers are able to exert control over 
executive management and over the shareholders, especially when they are seeking 
short-term financial returns for the company.  
 
Third, this question is particularly important in relation both to public companies and 
to large private companies with significant numbers of employees precisely because 
they are such a significant part of our society. They do not operate in a way that is 
sealed off from the rest of society. It is only capitalist corporate law theory which 
considers companies (and particularly their shareholders) as being hermetically sealed 
off from the rest of society. Large companies employ large numbers of people directly 
and are significant for the good health of the economy indirectly. Consequently, their 
investment and commercial decisions have a significant impact on the general 
economy as well as having direct impacts on the position of individual employees. 
This requires democratic intervention in the decision-making processes of companies 
in the form of stakeholder boards, as is considered next.  
 
 
                                                 
34 Tony Benn, Speech to the AUEW conference, Morecambe, May 1971, reproduced in Best of Benn, R 
Winstone (ed), Arrow, 2015, 168. 
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The democratic stakeholder board 
 
Democratic models in the UK should operate as a two-tier board on the German 
model, or as a way of allowing one or two representatives of the workers on the 
executive board, or as a hybrid of those two.35 The weakness of having only one or 
two workers’ representatives on a single, unitary board (as some suggest) is that they 
will always be voted down by the executive members of the board on any 
controversial matter.  
 
A two-tier board means that there is an ‘executive board’ comprised of the directors 
(and perhaps one or two representatives of the workers) which takes the day-to-day 
management decisions in relation to the company. There is also a ‘supervisory board’ 
(on the German model) comprised of representatives of workers and shareholders 
which has specific powers reserved to it. The supervisory board would be in control 
of the approval of the long-term strategy of the company, the decision to award 
dividends, the decision to make or withhold contributions to the company pension 
plan, the decision to approve or reject takeover offers, the decision to approve the 
annual audit and accounts, and so forth. Consequently, the long-term interests of the 
company are represented by this supervisory board. It is also possible (and this should 
be the case in the UK) to involve other stakeholders who are impacted by the affairs 
of this company into the supervisory board: representatives of the environmental and 
social impacts of the company, representatives of other interests in the economic 
supply chain, and representatives of the members of the company pension scheme. 
The advantage of having a two-tier board representing other stakeholders is that this 
second-tier, ‘stakeholder board’ can be reserved sole decision-making power over 
issues affecting the long-term position of the company. The Companies Act would 
require amendment to specify those issues which are reserved to the stakeholder 
board, and how the rights of shareholders are to be qualified by the enlarged rights of 
other stakeholders in the company.  
 
The composition of the stakeholder board should include representatives of the 
workers and of the long-term shareholders in equal measure. The presence of workers 
on the stakeholder board with half of the voting rights would look to the long-term 
interests of the company and to the treatment of its employees. Different forms of 
company should have different stakeholders involved in their decision-making. For 
example, supermarkets should have representatives of the food chain – including 
farmers and manufacturers – to intervene in relation to the way in which companies 
contract with their suppliers, how they set their payment policies, and how they 
squeeze margins in the economy generally.  
 
The arguments against this sort of proposal are generally based on a perceived 
understanding of traditional, capitalist corporate models. In particular, the property 
rights of the shareholders are said to be in peril. What this argument overlooks is that 
the nature of shareholdings in the UK economy has changed markedly in recent years. 
At present, shareholdings in UK public companies are held 54% by overseas 
investors.36 The understanding that shares in public companies are held by UK-based 
institutional investors no longer holds true. Today, the Bank of England’s Chief 
                                                 
35 M Andenas and F Wooldridge, European Company Law, CUP, 2012.  
36 See, on this older understanding, J Parkinson, Corporate Power and Corporate Responsibility, Oxford 
University Press, 1993.  
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Economist estimates that only 12% of shares are held by individuals and 9% by 
pension funds in the UK.37 The average period for which shares are held in public 
companies in the UK has declined from five years in the mid-1960s,38 to two years in 
the 1980s, and is now estimated by the Bank of England’s Chief Economist to be only 
about one month today.39 The crisis of short-termism in modern capitalism is no more 
clearly expressed than that. The run-of-the-mill capitalists will probably not own their 
shares in those companies for more than a month. Where dividend pay-outs used to 
equate to about 10% of corporate profits, today they amount to about 70% of those 
profits, thus indicating how value is bled out of companies instead of being invested 
in research and development, staff training, staff salaries and pensions.40 
Consequently, the modern shareholder capitalists have very little attachment to these 
companies.  
 
It is important to focus on the long-term success of the company. Those with only a 
short-term interest in the company’s share value should not be permitted to vote at 
company meetings nor to be represented on the stakeholder board. A minimum 
qualifying period (e.g. twelve or six months) for shareholding should be adopted 
before any shareholder can vote, as recommended in 2012 by the ‘Kay Review of UK 
Equity Markets and Long-term Decision Making’.41 Speculators who drive up share 
prices in the event of a takeover should not be eligible to vote. Shareholding has 
become a short-term, profit-orientated activity in ways that were never previously 
imaginable.42  
 
The etymology of the word ‘company’ is enlightening. The English word ‘company’ 
derives from the Latin word ‘com’ (meaning ‘together’) and ‘panio (meaning 
‘bread’). Thus a ‘company’ was originally someone with whom one broke bread – 
like a company having dinner together or going to the theatre. This sense of the word 
suggested a bond between individuals. There is no likelihood of any such bond 
between the majority of shareholders today. Rather, the modern investors are 
concerned only with a short-term return from their shares, and are likely to be 
investors situated outside the UK.  
 
Due to the short-term nature of investment in companies, there is a great difference 
between the objectives of the investors in a company and the people who are 
employed by that company. The people with a long-term stake in the company are the 
employees, not the majority of modern shareholders. Consequently, it makes 
considerably more sense to give the employees legal control through a stakeholder 
                                                 
37 AG Haldane, Chief Economist at the Bank of England, ‘Patience and Finance’, Speech at Oxford 
China Business Forum, Beijing, 2 September 2010.  
38 For a BBC Newsnight interview with Haldane on this topic, see here: 
http://touchstoneblog.org.uk/2015/07/andy-haldane-shareholder-primacy-is-bad-for-economic-growth/. 
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2010/speech445.pdf). 
39 Ibid, AG Haldane, as reported in The Daily Telegraph, ‘Thatcher's dream for UK investors has 
become a nightmare’, 17 May 2015 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/11610490/Thatchers-dream-
for-UK-investors-has-become-a-nightmare.html). 
40 As measured by the Capita Dividend Monitor: see, e.g. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
41716283 . 
41 https://www.gov.uk/.../bis-12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf 
42 The anticipated investment return from companies has also changed. Whereas companies used to pay 
out 10% of their profits by way of dividends in the 1970s, public companies typically pay out 70% of 
their profits in that form today (with even more being paid out by companies like BHS). 
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board over the long-term strategy and behaviour of the company than to give that 
control to shareholders who are likely only to hold their shares for a few weeks.  
 
 
Replacing formalistic directors’ duties with meaningful social engagement 
 
Beyond the need for long-term focus within trading companies, there is also a need to 
consider the place of the company within the public life of a society. Companies are 
employers, they occupy physical space, they impact on the environment, they 
participate in significant ways in the economy, and they form a significant part of UK 
pension portfolios. Nevertheless, our corporate law takes too little account of this role 
of the company as a public, social actor. All social actors, it is suggested, must be 
subject to democratic control.  
 
The arguments about the nature of corporate control have resulted in a series of weak 
compromises over the generations. Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 was the 
uneasy compromise made between, on the one hand, expanding the duties of directors 
so as to make companies more socially aware and, on the other hand, the traditional 
approach of allowing the company’s shareholders and directors to focus solely on the 
desire of the company to make profit. Building on the pre-existing, unclear case law 
concept, s172 requires that each director must act in a way (not necessarily ensure that 
the company acts in a way) which ‘would be most likely to promote the success of the 
company’.43 The director must ‘have regard (among other matters)’ to the long-term 
effects of any decision; the interests of the company’s employees; business 
relationships with customers and creditors; the impact of the company on the 
environment; the desirability of a reputation for high standards of business conduct 
(not necessarily high standards of business conduct); and the ‘need to act fairly 
between members of the company’.44 Significantly, none of these factors bears any 
sanction if they are not implemented in any individual director’s decisions. The 
director must ‘have regard’, merely that, to the social impact of the company.  
 
Companies have direct, social impacts constantly: every expansion of their premises, 
every hiring or firing decision, every withholding of pensions contributions, every 
relocation of business activities, has a direct effect on the human beings, communities 
and commercial enterprises around them. This places companies in a public, social 
space which needs to be recognised as such. Companies are not simply private, 
capitalist investment relationships. Rather, they are public reservoirs of economic 
power which have public effects. Consequently, they should be subjected to internal, 




IV. TRUSTS AND ULTRA-CAPITALISM 
 
The roots of trusts law 
 
                                                 
43 Companies Act 2006, s172(1).  
44 Ibid.  
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Trusts are central to the way in which law has supported capitalism over the centuries. 
The central paradox of trusts law is that it has its roots in Aristotle’s Ethics and in the 
idea of conscience as developed in the case law,45 and yet the core principles of 
express trusts law are based on the rigid requirements of the three certainties46 and the 
need for a beneficiary before an express trust can be validly constituted.47 There is a 
tension between ethical flexibility and rigid rules. This is significant because, 
paradoxically, tax avoidance requires hard-and-fast rules if it is to function. There is a 
Peanuts cartoon which explains perfectly the philosophy behind all regulatory 
avoidance. Linus has just had the rules of a game explained to him. He is delighted 
because knowing the rules has given him power. As he put it:  
 
‘I love the rules. Once you know the rules you can cheat.’  
 
When law is organised as a system of rules, it becomes possible for people to 
manipulate those rules or to slip through the cracks between those rules. UK tax law is 
predicated on statutory rules which are applied literally, even when it is a trust which 
is being used to avoid tax. Consequently, the rigidification of trusts law in several key 
cases has helped lawyers to create structures which avoid tax. 
 
The strength of trusts law ought to lie in the inherent flexibility of equitable concepts. 
It is a combination of open-textured principles and rules-based techniques which has 
made the trust so successful because it grants endless possibilities for holding 
property on a foundation of strict rules which can be moulded and adapted as context 
demands. Crucially, these high-level principles also allow the courts to prevent ‘crafty 
contrivances’48 by reference to over-arching principles of good conscience. Successful 
‘anti-avoidance’ law depends on a combination of flexible principle which can meet 
artificial avoidance schemes but which nevertheless give rise to a firm pattern of 
reliable rules which can be obeyed and understood in society.  
 
Nevertheless, trusts are central to ultra-capitalism precisely because their rules are 
complex, often rigidified in key areas, and because the professional illuminati who 
use them for their wealthy private clients are free to mould them to service their 
clients’ needs. Trusts law was moulded by skilful practitioners over the centuries to 
service the needs of the landed classes, and then ratified by the courts after the event. 
It is important to observe that the case law on trusts is reactive to what has happened 
in practice. The law has always followed along behind developments in practice and 
thus has been its servant. The principles of trusts law were in truth only ever ex post 
facto explanations of how practical innovations and earlier court judgments fitted 
together.  
 
Hitherto, clever practitioners have always drafted trusts so that property could be 
concealed from spouses and creditors, so that taxes could be avoided (often by leaving 
it unclear as to which potential beneficiary might take an equitable interest), and so 
that unknown mistresses and children could take secret benefits without the family 
                                                 
45 Alastair Hudson, Equity & Trusts, 9th ed, Routledge, section 1.1. The decision of Lord Ellesmere in 
Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615) 1 Eq Cas 1 clearly draws on Aristotle’s idea that equity is superior to law 
and that its role is to ‘mollify and soften the extremity of the law’.  
46 Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beav 148. 
47 Leahy v Attorney-General for New South Wales [1959] AC 457. 
48 As identified by Lord Ellesmere in the Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615) Ch Rep 1. 
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knowing.49 So important are practitioners to the international tax avoidance industry 
that the trusts statutes in many jurisdictions were drafted by prominent practitioners 
precisely to facilitate tax avoidance in those territories.50 We shall consider the 
example of the Cayman Islands below.  
 
The lack of registration for trusts in the UK – due to the fact that they can be inferred 
into existence without the parties even knowing that they exist51 – means that they can 
hold assets beyond regulatory oversight.52 A key reform of UK tax law to deal with 
trusts should be to require the withholding of preferential tax treatment for trusts 




The connivance of the Chancery courts in tax avoidance 
 
The ways in which the legal system connives in the deployment of law as a capitalist 
technique are several. The courts do it frequently by supporting the enforceability of 
trusts law models which are solely useful for tax avoidance and asset management. 
They do this directly on occasion by approving tax avoidance techniques, and they do 
it indirectly by a style of law-making which prioritises hard-and-fast rules and literal 
interpretations of statutes. The legislature connives in tax avoidance by insisting on 
drafting a colossal tax code in the form of a collection of rigid, micro-rules, as 
opposed to flexible principles combined with specific rules.  
 
The courts are often engaged in helping the legal professionals avoid tax. The 
Vandervell litigation provides a good example well-known to every properly-prepared 
English or Welsh undergraduate law student. Section 53(1)(c) of the Law of Property 
Act 1925 requires that dispositions of an equitable interest must ‘be in’ signed 
writing. This posed an obstacle to taxpayers who wanted to avoid having to pay stamp 
duty on transfers of shares which required a formal transfer document. In Grey v 
IRC,53 Viscount Simonds held that the word ‘disposition’ should be given its natural 
meaning such that an oral instruction to transfer shares would not be effective until it 
was reduced to writing subsequently, thus requiring signed writing.  
 
However, the House of Lords in Vandervell v IRC54 held that this statutory 
requirement could be avoided if the legal title and the equitable interest in those 
shares were transferred together. This decision created an arbitrary exception to the 
statutory rule which created a highway down which tax dodgers could drive their 
stamp duty avoidance schemes. Significantly, it was this judgment of the House of 
Lords which created a mechanism for avoiding stamp duty which had not previously 
existed in English law. Similarly, in Chinn v Collins,55 the House of Lords held that a 
contract to transfer the equitable interest would also avoid this rule. Again, a decision 
                                                 
49 Eg Re Boyes (1884) 26 Ch D 531. 
50 See GW Thomas and AS Hudson, The Law of Trusts, 2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2010, Part V 
generally. 
51 Paul v Constance [1977] 1 WLR 527; Re Kayford [1975] 1 WLR 279. 
52 AS Hudson, “Asset Protection Trusts” in The International Trust, D Hayton (ed), Jordans Publishing, 
2011, p.345-522. 
53 [1960] AC 1.  
54 [1967] 2 AC 291.  
55 [1981] AC 533.  
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of the highest court knowingly manufactured a means of avoiding tax. An entire 
undergraduate seminar can be devoted to cases assisting professionals in eluding this 
principle. Our law schools typical train students how to use these techniques rather 
than teach them how to protect beneficiaries in pension funds. Our courts often 




International trusts law and ultra-capitalism 
 
After the publication of the Panama Papers in 2015 and the Paradise Papers in 2017, 
the popular press has finally begun to take tax avoidance seriously. It was already 
well-known that offshore tax havens shielded assets from taxation and from 
regulation. The OECD had already published several reports about uncooperative tax 
havens. Lord Wilberforce – in a show of laudable judicial creativity – had developed 
the principles in the 1980s which slowed tax avoidance by refusing to allow 
‘artificial’ avoidance schemes to be treated as being effective for tax purposes.56 That 
was before a different generation of judges (with former practices in commercial 
chancery law) reverted to the old ways of using literal interpretations of statutes to 
allow disingenuous tax avoidance schemes to be effective if they complied – in a way 
that Linus would have recognised in the Peanuts cartoon – with the literal 
requirements of the rules.57 However, until the global financial crisis, the popular 
press had never taken tax avoidance seriously. Nor had any British government. What 
is more significant perhaps is that the trust device has been used by the legislatures in 
tax havens to encourage regulatory avoidance by that cadre of professionals who 
service the ultra-capitalists like those birds that pick parasites off basking 
hippopotami.   
 
 
The role of trusts law in offshore tax dodging 
 
The colossal international tax avoidance industry relies on a few, very small technical 
innovations. For example, the commercial attractiveness of tax havens – like the 
Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands and the British Virgin Islands – depends in large 
part upon trusts laws which dispense with the need for a beneficiary.58 In England and 
Wales, the ‘beneficiary principle’ provides that there cannot be a valid express trust 
without there being a beneficiary.59 The absence of a beneficiary – such that there is 
only an abstract purpose underpinning the trust – will lead to the trust being void.60 
Thus, one of the most tedious parts of an undergraduate law programme is pivotal to 
one of the most significant political questions of our day: how to stop international tax 
avoidance.   
 
                                                 
56 Ramsay v IRC [1982] AC 300; Furniss v Dawson [1984] AC 474  
57 Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson [2004] UKHL 51; [2005] 1 AC 684. 
58 See AS Hudson, ‘Asset protection trusts’ in D Hayton (ed), The International Trust, 3rd ed, Jordans 
Publishing, 2011, 345, at 442 et seq.  
59 Morice v. Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves 399; (1805) 10 Ves 522. 
60 Re Nottage [1885] 2 Ch 649; Leahy v. Att-Gen. for New South Wales [1959] AC 457; Re Grant’s WT 
[1979] 3 All ER 359. 
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The challenge for the seller of offshore trusts services is the following. To attract 
investors, they must promise a tax efficient structure and/or an absence of regulatory 
oversight. The former structure is attractive to the ultra-capitalist who wants to shield 
their wealth from the indignities of taxation, whereas the latter is attractive to 
international criminal and terrorist organisations who want to garner wealth beyond 
regulatory control.61 To this end, it is advantageous if the investor can invest in a trust 
structure in such a way that they, and their associates and affiliates, will not be 
identified as having any beneficial interest in the investment property or its profits. 
Consequently, the imaginative approach taken by jurisdictions of this type has been to 
provide that an official known as a ‘protector’ or ‘enforcer’ can stand in the place of 
the beneficiary, but without having any equitable interest in the trust property, and be 
empowered to ensure that the trustee performs their duties. This means that the 
investor has no property rights which can be taxed and has only a contractual 
relationship with the investment manager. Security is provided by the protector.  
By reducing the trust from the level of a proprietary relationship, as traditionally 
understood in the English tradition in cases such as Saunders v Vautier,62 to that of a 
mere contract (as commentators like Langbein,63 Hayton64 and Penner 65 suggest), the 
trust can be used as an investment device without the investors being recognised for 
tax purposes as having proprietary rights in the trust fund. As outlined above, these 
tax havens have generally altered their own trusts law codes explicitly to accept as 
trusts such devices where there is no equitable, proprietary title for the beneficiary. 
Let us consider one example of this phenomenon in a little detail.  
 
The “STAR trust” was created by statute in the Cayman Islands by means of the 
“Special Trusts (Alternative Regime) Law 1997” which created this “special trust”.66 
This statute provides that there does not need to be a beneficiary with any enforceable 
equitable rights for there to be a valid trust (which is therefore the opposite of the 
English approach). Rather, the legal practitioners who drafted the statute decided to 
use another model: rather than a beneficiary with property rights in the income-
generating trust property, there can be an “enforcer” who can proceed against the 
trustees in the event that the trustees do not perform their duties properly but without 
having any proprietary rights.67  
 
Clearly, this would not satisfy the beneficiary principle (as currently understood) in 
England because the beneficiary cannot enforce the trust in their capacity as a 
beneficiary and the beneficiary does not have an enforceable right to the trust 
property. However, it is valid under Cayman Islands trusts law. The concern of 
practitioners in jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands is that if English courts will not 
accept such structures as being trusts (and if they would therefore consider the client-
taxpayer to be still the absolute owner of the property on resulting trust principles),68 
                                                 
61 The Guardian, ‘Why we are shining a light on the world of tax havens again’, 5 November 2017. 
62 Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115.  
63 J Langbein, “The contractarian basis of the law of trusts” (1995) 105 Yale Law Journal 625. 
64 D Hayton, ‘Developing the obligation characteristic of the trust’ (2001) 117 LQR 96. 
65 J Penner, ‘Exemptions’, in P Birks and A Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust, 2002, Oxford: Hart, 241. 
66 That statute has since been consolidated into Part VII of the Trusts Law (2001 Revision). 
67 Section 100(1) of the 2001 Revision Law provides: ‘A beneficiary of a special trust does not as such 
have standing to enforce the trust, or an enforceable right against a trustee or an enforcer, or an 
enforceable right to the trust property.’ 
68 Vandervell v IRC [1967] 2 AC 291, HL. 
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then a so-called ‘limping trust’ is created69 which would be accepted as being validly 
constituted in their jurisdiction but not in England. The argument is advanced by 
others that there is no need to enforce the beneficiary principle strictly if there is some 
other person (typically dubbed a ‘protector’ or ‘enforcer’ in such a jurisdiction) who 
can sue as though a beneficiary under the trust, so satisfying the beneficiary principle 
by other means.70 
 
The key point is that the investor should be able to say to their domestic tax 
authorities:  
 
“I have no equitable interest in any trust. Quite how all of this income keeps 
paying for the roofs over my head, the yachts beneath my feet and the 
aeroplanes that whisk me hither and yon, is a matter of no little amazement to 
me.”  
 
All of this, of course, is entirely disingenuous nonsense. The tax havens are in hock to 
the service providers – law firms, private client arms of investment banks, 
accountancy firms, shadow bankers and others – who attract clients to these 
territories. The good people of the tiny island of Anguilla, for example, undoubtedly 
lead lives of blameless, productive domesticity in which tourism and fishing play no 
small part. However, the most profitable activities performed on that island are not 
linked to tourism or fishing. Rather, foreign interests use that island for the benefit of 
their foreign clients. Anguilla plays little physical part in many of these transactions. 
Instead, the island nominally plays host to many offshore tax avoidance arrangements. 
Importantly, trusts law as it is used by international trusts lawyers is a central part of 
modern ultra-capitalism.  
 
 
How to eradicate offshore tax avoidance 
 
It is an unacceptable truth that some jurisdictions give over legislative time to 
allowing bankers, lawyers and accountants to attract tax dodgers, organised criminals 
and international terrorists to invest assets secretly, and without payment of a 
meaningful amount of tax through their territories. It is an even more unacceptable 
truth that many of these jurisdictions are British Overseas Territories and British 
protectorates. Different territories have different constitutional arrangements – in 
some cases, such as Anguilla, those rules are set by the British administrator, whereas 
in other territories it is the domestic legislature which chooses to legislate (as in the 
Cayman Islands) in a way that benefits the regulatory avoidance community. In either 
case, the British government should insist (along with a genuine provision of adequate 
levels of aid) that these territories must repeal the statutes which facilitate and 
encourage tax dodging and transactions in dark money, and that they must make 
information about funds being invested in their territories publicly available to 
revenue and other regulatory authorities, on pain of losing British support for their 
territories. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is potentially the most significant 
actor in bringing an end to offshore tax avoidance. Diplomacy is thus the greatest 
weapon against tax avoidance and international terrorist and criminal funding.  
                                                 
69 D Waters, ‘Reaching for the sky – taking trusts laws to the limit, in D Hayton (ed), Extending the 
Boundaries of Trusts and Similar Ring-fenced Funds, 2002, Hague: Kluwer Law International, 59. 




The beneficiary principle and the great game of modern democracy 
 
Clearly a large amount of modern trusts law is therefore involved in what Victorians 
might have called ‘a great game’. A game in which the TUC has estimated that £25 
billion may be lost to the UK public exchequer annually at a time when social security 
benefits and public services are being cut to the bone.71 So, if it is a game, then it is 
not a funny one. There have been calls by Hayton and others to dispense with the 
beneficiary principle in favour of the use of protectors in English trusts law.72 This is a 
development which must be resisted with all of the earnestness at our disposal. At a 
time of austerity in particular it would be obscene to make it easier for tax dodgers to 
elude their liabilities to the state. The beneficiary principle remains a bulwark against 
tax dodging with impunity in England and Wales and it must be maintained.  
 
As Lord Denning put it:73  
  
‘The avoidance of tax may be lawful, but it is not yet a virtue. The Court of 
Chancery should not encourage or support it - it should not give its approval to 
it - if by so doing it would imperil the true welfare of the children, already 
born or yet to be born [who are beneficiaries under trusts].’ 
 
The role of the courts in this regard is complex: sometimes complicit in tax 
avoidance, sometimes resistant to it. The modern trend, however, has been for a 
permissive approach, as in cases like Barlcays Mercantile v Mawson where the House 
of Lords opted for the literal reading of tax statutes which would appeal to cheating 




V. THE PRIVATISATION OF LAW 
 
The logic of capitalism is that it takes control of everything it can control, that it takes 
ownership of everything that it can possibly own, and that it evolves beyond the 
nation state into international markets.74 The effect on the rule of law is complex. In 
international financial markets, law has been ‘privatised’. That is, the law has had its 
most useful features extracted from it by the lawyers who facilitate it. These are 
lawyers in the largest international law firms, lawyers employed in-house in 
investment banks, and lawyers who work in tax havens. They work alongside 
accountants, public relations specialists, professional lobbyists, investment bankers 
and traders. Those legal techniques, taken principally from the creative incubators of 
common law jurisdictions, are then deployed as part of a closed system by legal 
                                                 
71 TUC, ‘The Missing Billions’, 
https://www.tuc.org.uk/touchstone/Missingbillions/1missingbillions.pdf  Authored by Richard Murphy, 
http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/ 
72 D Hayton, ‘Developing the Obligation Characteristic of the Trust’ (2001) 117 LQR 97. See also the 
essays in D Hayton, Extending the Boundaries of Trusts and Similar Ring-fenced Funds, Kluwer Law 
International, 2002. 
73 [1969] 1 Ch 234, at 245. 
74 AS Hudson, ‘Too much monkey business’, Tribune, 29 October 1993.  
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professionals who want to achieve clear goals for their clients: such as the protection 
of assets, the acquisition of preferential rates of funding through financial 
engineering, and the avoidance of regulatory oversight.  
 
A good example is the derivatives markets. The derivatives markets operate across 
borders. That is to say, derivatives are contracted on trading floors in the leading 
financial centres and then ‘booked’ through whichever office of that bank is the most 
convenient from a legal, fiscal and regulatory standpoint. For example, an interest rate 
swap contracted by telephone between traders in Paris and Frankfurt may be 
expressed to be governed by English law and recorded in the accounts of both 
institutions as having taken place in the Dutch Antilles through shell corporations 
registered in that territory for that purpose. Such transactions are common and are 
facilitated by specialist lawyers and accountants employed or retained by both 
institutions. The legal relationships between banks are conducted in accordance with 
standard market contracts drafted by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (‘ISDA’), which is a trade body representing the interests of the 
derivatives trading community and funded by the largest investment banks through 
their membership of it. The concepts which underpin the ISDA documentation 
architecture dominate those markets and include its Master Agreement which governs 
90% of all derivatives in the $20 trillion derivatives market.75 These standard 
documents are comprised of hybrid concepts taken from English law and New York 
law. That is, domestic legal techniques which have been abstracted for this 
international, avowedly non-territorial, supra-national purpose.  
 
Financial institutions very rarely take their disputes to court. Instead, the ISDA Master 
Agreement was drafted by committees of employees from the largest investment 
banks to find a consensus between them in advance of any disputes.76 ISDA even 
created an alternative dispute mechanism to prevent its contracts ever being taken to 
court and tested. The greatest risk to those markets in the 1990s when the markets 
began in their modern form was considered to be judges interfering and ruling those 
contracts invalid in some way. Consequently, litigation was avoided by simply never 
going to court. This is a simple way of acting beyond the law: you never involve the 
courts at all. Disputes have only gone to court when outsiders – principally municipal 
water authorities,77 UK local authorities,78 and corporations which are not major 
investment banks – have sought a court’s ruling on the efficacy of those contracts.79 
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the English courts have been eager to 
support the validity of these contracts so that the insolvency of Lehman Brothers 
could be processed as calmly as possible.80 The UK Supreme Court has even 
overturned one of the shibboleths of English trusts law (as to the requirement of 
certainty of subject matter prior to the validity of a trust) to procure the outcome 
                                                 
75 The derivatives market was estimated by the Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”) to be worth 
a gross amount of US$ 19.5 trillion in June 2011, down from US$ 25.3 trillion in June 2009: see Lomas 
v JFB Firth Rixson [2010] EWHC 3372 (Ch), [2011] 2 BCLC 120. 
76 AS Hudson, The Law on Financial Derivatives, 6th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 2018. 
77 E.g. UBS AG, London Branch and another v Kommunale Wasserwerke Leipzig GMBH [2010] 
EWHC 2566 (Comm). 
78 Eg Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington [1996] AC 669. 
79 A slew of cases involving SME’s who were sold interest rate swaps disastrously before the global 
financial crisis has begun to emerge: e.g. Green v RBS [2013] EWCA Civ 1197. 
80 Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2011] UKSC 38, [2011] 3 
WLR 521. 
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which the liquidators of Lehman Brothers considered most beneficial for the winding 
up of that bank.81  
 
In consequence, the rule of law has been subjugated to the short-term demands of the 
banking system. Not only did every judgment in the several streams of Lehman 
Brothers litigation prostrate itself on the altar of commercial necessity, but the rules 
were altered or re-explained so as to accommodate the needs of the liquidators. 
Meanwhile, those responsible for the collapse of those financial institutions and the 
reckless construction of ruinous financial instruments have never faced personal 
liability in court.  
 
The question of the rule of law in an era of ultra-capitalism is significant. The 
regulations which govern financial institutions are created in consultation with them – 
in a way that burglars are not, for example, invited to give their view of the impact on 
their businesses of any reform of the law of theft. At the most visible level, the Dodd-
Frank Act in the USA was controlled and limited by the work of bank lobbyists, to the 
constant outrage of Senator Elizabeth Warren (formerly a professor of banking law at 
Harvard). The ‘Bank Lobbyists Act’, as Warren calls it, that is currently passing 
through Congress (at the time of writing in March 2018), promises to re-categorise 
many US investment banks so that they are no longer covered by the Dodd-Frank 
capital maintenance requirements nor by the Volcker rule prohibiting them from 
investing their own capital in derivatives transactions (so-called ‘proprietary trading’). 
Many more lawyers and other professionals have worked on dismantling the Dodd-
Frank legislation than worked on assembling it originally.  
 
At a more quotidian level, the work of the EU in processing financial services 
legislation is in hock both to the banks’ formal lobbyists and to their informal 
lobbyists in the form of largest legal and accounting firms. Eurostar is like a moving 
walkway between the largest law firms, accountancy firms and lobbyists in London 
and the European institutions in Brussels. The Financial Conduct Authority consults 
on every mooted change and development, even in the wake of the financial crisis. No 
one asserts that there is a statutory power granted to the FCA to create regulation for 
the ‘obedience’ of banks. Instead, the financial sector seeks merely to ‘comply’ with 
regulatory principles, almost begrudgingly. Banks have ‘compliance’ departments not 
‘obedience’ departments. The word ‘comply’ meaning to ‘work with’ rather than to 
obey. It suggests a partnership of equals rather than the exercise of positivist 
sovereign power by the statutory regulators. Significantly, the principles governing 
the implementation of those regulations are also created in negotiation with the 
financial sector. Having brought capitalism to the brink of collapse in 2008-09, the 
financial sector is still allowed to have an input into the creation of the rules which are 
supposed to bind it. Thus the ultra-capitalism practised in the largest financial 
institutions exerts pressure and insists on being an equal partner in the creation of the 
laws which bind it.  
 
This process of a refusal to accept the idea of the rule of law by lawyers themselves in 
the banking industry came home to me when I worked in investment banking in the 
1990s.82 An anecdote will serve to make the point. I was invited to attend a meeting of 
                                                 
81 Lehman Brothers (International) Europe v CRC [2012] UKSC 6, [2012] Bus LR 667.  
82 I worked, for a while, in investment banking while researching my PhD and first two books. An old-
fashioned approach, I know. 
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the full board of the International Accounting Standards Board to advise them on the 
content of the law on derivatives as they looked to create new accounting standards 
for the treatment of derivatives globally. This body sets the standards which apply in 
each jurisdiction although they operate (as a visual spectacle) somewhat like the 
organisation SMERSH in a James Bond film: all members participating via video link 
from various parts of the world, each participant sitting behind a nameplate bearing 
the name of the territory they represented. The Board was concerned not to change its 
rules on a false assumption that there were no legal problems facing derivatives 
markets. I reassured the Board that there remained several problems in the detail of 
the law dealing with derivatives and that, consequently, they should not change their 
sceptical approach on the erroneous understanding that all was well with the law on 
derivatives. The basis for this assertion was that different judges had come to different 
conclusions about the operation of English law in relation to that standard market 
contract.83 I explained that the courts had taken several surprising or, alternatively, 
principled approaches to standard market derivatives contracts in recent years. A 
lawyer representing a magic circle law firm or an investment bank (it was difficult to 
tell because he shifted around behind two different nameplates during the morning 
session) then said one of the stupidest things I have ever heard come out of a lawyer’s 
mouth:  
 
‘Why should I care what judges think?’  
 
His attitude – one which I have encountered frequently in international banking 
circles, particularly among middle-management84 – was that domestic law is 
unimportant and that national regulation is something that can be eluded or managed 
away (like all other risks). The belief is that international finance operates at a level 
above the nation state.  
 
In practice, those lawyers who work inside the derivatives industry have taken what 
they find useful from English law and New York law and privatised it in their 
offshore markets beyond the reach, they hope, of the domestic courts. One example of 
this tendency would be the concepts informing taking security through contract and 
property law which have been moulded into the troublesome concept of 
‘collateralisation’ by the derivatives markets’ lawyers, and then transmitted back into 
domestic law through the EU’s Collateralisation Directive which enshrined the 
bankers’ practice into law at their insistence. These proposals were enshrined in EU 
and domestic law at the instruction of the banking industry. This is so even though 
they fail completely to make important differentiations between assets being held 
subject to a ‘mortgage, charge or pledge’ (as the central provision in the ISDA Credit 
Support Deed provides) as if those concepts were one-and-the-same thing – which 
clearly they are not.85 The result is the creation of law at the behest of the banking 
industry which is predicated on a legal nonsense in the standard market contracts 
created by that same banking industry. This reflection back into domestic law might 
be considered to be a respect for national law after all. In fact, it reflected a fear that 
national law might interfere and rule on the efficacy of these arrangements in an 
                                                 
83 Eg Peregrine Fixed Income Ltd v. Robinson [2000] C.L.C. 1328, [2000] Lloyd’s Rep. Bank, 304. 
84 The rank is significant. Middle management do not have to face the Press or the shareholders. 
Middle management conduct most of the bank’s business unseen. Consequently, their attitudes are very 
important and should be overseen more closely by the FCA Systems and Controls rulebook.  
85 AS Hudson, The Law on Financial Derivatives, 6th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 2018. 
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unhelpful way. Consequently, the finance industry lobbied the policymakers in 
Brussels to change the law so that their practices would not be challenged in domestic 




VI. ADDRESSING DEEPER QUESTIONS OF OWNERSHIP: CO-OPERATIVES AND 
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
Commercial enterprise is possible without capitalism. Commercial enterprise without 
capitalism means that the capital assets are not owned by a narrow social class but 
rather are owned by everyone who participates in that enterprise. The clearest 
example of this alternative model is the co-operative. The difficulty is that in the 21st 
century, the capitalists’ analysis of co-operatives is that they can be put to work as 
micro-financial institutions, as is illustrated by recent changes to the regulation of 
friendly societies and co-operatives in the UK. Those bodies are now treated as small 
financial institutions regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority shorn of the 
‘common bond’ which were previously essential to their constitution legally and 
which were central to their formation historically as mechanisms for working class 
solidarity.   
 
Traditionally, a co-operative combined a contractual agreement between members of 
a society with a form of property-holding that meant that those members owned 
nothing individually but rather that they held everything together as a collective.86 Co-
operatives are a hybrid of contract and property law concepts in which assets are used 
communally. That contract establishes a set of common objectives and the rules by 
which those assets can be used. Importantly, property law here does not operate so as 
to identify separate property rights for members in the same way that shareholders in 
a limited liability company have distinct property rights expressed through and 
embodied by their share. Rather, the members of a co-operative have property rights 
only when acting together in deciding how their co-operative’s assets should be used. 
An industrial and provident society was a ‘body corporate’ but not a limited company 
with shareholders. Consequently, it had all the benefits of being able to contract as a 
legal entity in its own right without any of the paraphernalia of a group of shareholder 
capitalists entitled to take away the surplus value from the enterprise based on their 
property rights. While the members contributed the capital of that society, they did so 
on the basis of contract. The principle of equality between the members of the society 
extended beyond democratic control of the activities of the society to an equal right in 
the surplus of the assets of the society. Distribution of surpluses could only take place 
in accordance with the terms of the society’s constitution, and not in the form of 
dividends or ‘fees’ bleeding value out of the organisation.  
 
The Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014 repealed the Industrial 
and Provident Societies Act 1965 and all subsequent legislation. Registration as a 
‘community benefit society’ (as a co-operative is now described) is now dependent 
upon the financial services regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority, being satisfied 
formalistically that any cooperative society is a “bona fide” society and that any 
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community benefit society will be “for the benefit of the community”.87 What is lost 
here is the ‘common bond’ which was always required by legislation for registration 
as a co-operative (or, industrial and provident society). Instead, a more nebulous idea 
of a ‘community benefit’ (using language akin to charities law) is used. Modern 
charities have developed – as the under-funded, statutory Charity Commission has 
reported88 – into conduits for money-laundering and tax avoidance with often only 
minimal benefit being delivered to the community by many of the 168,000 charities 
currently registered in the UK. Consequently, the focus on a diffuse community 
benefit as opposed to the solidarity of the old ‘common bond’ marks a significant shift 
in the legal conceptualisation of co-operatives.  
 
As the Labour Party manifesto suggested, there needs to be a regulator specific to the 
co-operative sector which is also competent to advise co-operatives’ members on 
establishing new associations. There needs to be clarity on the rights of co-operatives 
to borrow money and (especially in relation to Community Land Trusts which are 
responsible for so much social housing construction today) clarity about the ways in 
which they can go into insolvency so that lenders can recover their security. Without 
clarity as to the ability for lenders and investors to recover their security – for 
example, in relation to Community Land Trusts which have their land ‘locked’ for the 
purposes of the trust – there is great difficulty in raising capital for them. This 
combination of treating co-operatives as micro-financial institutions, and yet not 
legislating for them in ways which explain the rights of parties dealing with and 
through them, conspires to hinder their development.  
 
The Oxford Shorter English Dictionary definition of the verb “to co-operate” is “to 
work together for a common goal”.89 The legal sense of a co-operative combines the 
notion of people working together for a common goal with the idea that those people 
must not be carrying on a business mainly with a view to earning distributable profits 
in the manner of a limited liability company. Under general co-operative principles 
established by the International Co-operative Association, the property of a co-
operative must come under the democratic control of its members, and the members 
must be able to participate economically in the activities of the co-operative.90 
Another feature of the principles of co-operatives is said to be that membership ought 
to be open to the public, and not closed to a narrow ownership class.91 Co-operatives 
are also supposed to provide education and training for their members, and to work 
for the sustainable development of their communities through policies approved by 
their members.92  
 
This is the deeper point about the nature of co-operatives. A co-operative is a remnant 
of a working class self-help association of the sort described by EP Thompson in The 
Making of the English Working Class.93 Those early co-operatives, to take that term 
loosely, evolved from the earliest corresponding societies (which were taken to be 
                                                 
87 Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014, s 2(2).  
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seditious) through the industrial and provident societies, credit unions and friendly 
societies which grew out of working-class solidarity in the pre-Victorian era. They 
were later formalised by legislation in the 19th century as the Victorians realised that 
these structures enabled the working class to take care of themselves and thus provide 
a reliable workforce without the need for a welfare state. They were then ruinously 
converted into small-scale financial services providers in the 21st century shorn of the 
bonds which had been vital to their creation originally. By transferring friendly 
societies, credit unions and cooperatives to the comforting embrace of the Financial 
Conduct Authority94 there was no longer a need for those societies to express a 
common bond between their members. This has been central to the success of co-
operatives as resilient commercial enterprises which are more likely to survive 
economic troubles because of the commitment of their members to their identified 
common goals when compared to corporate business models. Moreover, it prioritises 
the financial services aspect (especially of friendly societies which are now 
recognised as insurance providers rather than as a local means of protecting workers 
who require assistance) or the capital-raising aspect (especially in relation to 
community benefit societies) of the enterprise, rather than its positive, collectivist 
objectives.  
 
In parallel with the Labour Party’s 2017 manifesto For the Many Not the Few, a 
document was published titled Alternative Models of Ownership95 which advocated a 
radical change to the British economy by means of developing co-operatives 
alongside traditional capitalist models. This is built on a critique of current British 
economy which is said to contain ‘a number of fundamental structural flaws that 
undermine economic strength and societal well-being’. One of the key flaws is 
identified as being the unprogrammed rise of automation which threatens the jobs of a 
huge part of the workforce, and the reservation of wealth and power to corporate 
interests which can be expected to create wealth for the few at the expense of the 
many. This concentration of wealth in the UK is said to be class-based and 
geographically-based, particularly draining wealth away from the former 
manufacturing and mining heartlands of the UK down to the financial services and 
governmental hubs in London and the South-East. The ambition in Alternative Models 
of Ownership is the development of the co-operative sector in the UK with four 
resultant benefits: strengthening democracy in the economy; promoting equality and 
financial security; remedying the lack of public funding for infrastructure projects; 
and organising the increasing automation and the digitisation of the economy. Briefly 
put, these goals are expected to flow from the very resilience of co-operative 
enterprises due to the bonds that exist de facto between their members (even if they 
are not now obligatory de jure), and the way in which they can be used by local 
government to acquire services locally from co-operative businesses so that that 
wealth stays locally (as opposed to being passed to multinational service-providing 
corporations which take that surplus wealth away from the local economy).  
 
In perhaps its most striking passage, Alternative Models of Ownership presents a 
history of neoliberal economics which has focused on arguments about limited 
liability companies and refining their regulation, but which has ignored the more 
profound political questions about whether that system is the right one (or the only 
possible one) at root. Despite all of this focus on regulating the limited liability 
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company, it is said that ‘there remain deeper questions of ownership.’ This cuts to the 
heart of the nature of capitalism as an ‘ism’. Capitalism requires that ownership of the 
means of production rests with the capitalist class, the landlords and the shareholders. 
By contrast, co-operatives come from another tradition which pre-dates the possibility 
of the acquisition of property rights by working class people.96 Co-operatives evolved 
at a time when working people owned nothing. The syndicalist and collectivist 
traditions emerged at a time when the members of the collective themselves as serfs 
were literally the property of a ‘land lord’ under the master-servant relationship. 
Therefore, the tradition of collective activity is based on accumulating wealth in a 
central pool so that it could be distributed for the common good of the members of the 
collective.  
 
There was simply no notion of individual rights: rather there was an understanding 
that the members were bound by their compact and entitled to the common wealth 
established by their collective labour and thrift. Their enforceability as contracts 
would only be effective once such people were recognised by English law as having 
sufficient personality to contract outwith the master-servant bond.97  
 
The common bond which was required of the older industrial and provident societies 
addressed the deeper questions of ownership identified by Alternative Models of 
Ownership by displacing the divisive idea of separate, individual property rights and 
replacing it with the collective idea of a contractual, co-operative bond between those 
members. This operates on the basis of democracy within the co-operative. The 
Labour manifesto For the Many Not the Few suggested a return to these values 
together with a complete reorganisation of the mechanisms for both the regulation and 






Our theme in this volume is whether or not capitalism has any redeeming feature. 
What is argued here is that it is not capitalism – the ideological system in which the 
wealth is held by a small social group – which might have any redeeming feature. 
Capitalism is redeeming only for the capitalist and for those who are content to take 
the little that the capitalist trickles down on them. Instead, redemption may come in 
the form of alternative models for commercial enterprises which are democratic and 
which do not depend on the despotic ownership of that undertaking’s assets by a 
narrow social class. This stretches from the reform of the limited liability company to 
make it democratic through to the reinvigoration of co-operative enterprises.  
 
Therefore, for there to be any redemption from within the capitalist system, that 
system must no longer be truly capitalist. This is particularly true of the 21st century’s 
particular form of plutocratic ultra-capitalism in which the wealthy have access to 
power and previously-unimaginable, purposeless wealth. This requires a conceptual 
revolution in some areas (introducing stakeholder boards and all that that entails, 
international diplomacy as a solution to tax avoidance, and detailed changes to 
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corporate law which will prevent the exsanguination of companies like BHS), and 
strategic reinforcement in others areas (the bolstering of the beneficiary principle in 
trusts law, the reintroduction of principles like the ‘progressive artificial steps 
doctrine’ in tax avoidance law, and the enlargement of the financial assistance 
principle in company law). It requires a recognition that it is law and that it is lawyers 
who are central to the operation of this rigged system; but that it is also through law 
that the challenges to the excesses of this ultra-capitalism can be brought.  
 
 
